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CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES. By Laurence H. Tribe.' 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 
458. $29.95. 
Jeremy Rabkin2 
In the preface to his new book, Laurence Tribe complains that 
too much current constitutional scholarship "either focuses so 
closely on constitutional doctrine, or looks to matters so distant 
from doctrine, as to bear no real resemblance to doing constitutional 
law .... "3 This book is certainly not like that. It is clearly a prod-
uct of "doing constitutional law." 
The opening chapter on "The Futile Search for Legitimacy" 
expresses exasperation with all theoretical efforts to delimit the le-
gitimate bounds, sources, or aims of judicial review. Rather, Tribe 
urges, we ought to remember that "no exercise of power, in any 
society the planet has ever seen, is genuinely unproblematic"4 and 
then get on with the vital task of debating the substantive merits of 
particular efforts at "constitutional problem-solving." He continu-
ally insists on the need to remain sensitive to different viewpoints,s 
to keep "replacing arrogant certitudes ... with a more open search 
for a shared future."6 Tribe's desire for an "open" Constitution 
makes him as impatient with historical inquiries into the original 
intent of the framers as with abstract theories about the proper role 
of courts in a democracy. Like a good contemporary practitioner, 
he wastes almost no space on Locke or Blackstone or The Federalist 
and instead bases almost all his arguments on Supreme Court deci-
sions of the last two decades. Being an unusually skillful and imagi-
native practitioner, however-and drawing on an unusually 
confused period of constitutional history-Tribe is able to tease 
quite diverse and often quite radical implications from this material. 
He is entitled to consider himself one of the charmed circle of 
those who "do" constitutional law for the rest of us. A distin-
guished professor at the Harvard Law School, author of a widely 
I. Ralph S. Tyler, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. 
2. Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University. 
3. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES at X (1985) (emphasis in original). 
4. /d. at 7 (emphasis in original). 
5. /d. at 8. 
6. /d. at 267. 
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cited, encyclopedic treatise on constitutional law, Tribe also main-
tains an active private practice and has himself argued a number of 
major cases before the Supreme Court over the past decade. Many 
of the legal arguments in this book were originally developed in 
briefs for clients and, though his arguments have not always pre-
vailed with the Burger Court (as we learn in the endnotes to this 
volume), Tribe has clearly established himself as one of the most 
resourceful advocates in contemporary constitutional practice. 
Constitutional Choices is of most interest, in fact, as a reflection 
of the broad range of causes and issues that one may encounter in 
"doing constitutional law" these days. The book is actually a col-
lection of essays on a grab-bag of assorted topics, mirroring the re-
markable diversity of Tribe's pursuits. Many of the essays derive 
from purely academic lectures or papers and all have been refined 
or restitched to make for a highly readable and quite topical collec-
tion. But the range of topics is a continual reminder of the ex-
traordinary scope afforded by "doing constitutional law." And the 
collection as a whole illustrates the remarkable maneuvering room 
for imaginative advocates that is made available by an "open" ap-
proach to the Constitution. 
Tribe juggles his diverse clients and commitments with 
aplomb. One essay growing out of his private practice, for example, 
criticizes the Reagan administration for foiling an attempted bond 
issue (by the government of Guam) by unilaterally announcing its 
intention to make the bonds taxable. Tribe offers a clever argument 
on behalf of the due process claims of the bondholders in this in-
stance-without any apology for (or even acknowledgement of) his 
suggestion in a different essay that the country needs a massive re-
distribution of capital. 
Similarly, he argues at length in another essay that the courts 
should not attempt to rule on ambiguous procedural questions con-
cerning the adoption of constitutional amendments, but instead 
should let Congress decide, for example, whether states may rescind 
previous votes to ratify. Otherwise, "the Supreme Court would fre-
quently be asked to pass on the legitimacy of actions taken to cor-
rect perceived flaws in its own jurisprudence-a task with 
uncomfortable implications for the integrity of the judicial enter-
prise. " 7 These arguments, we learn from an endnote, were inspired 
by his work on behalf of the National Organization of Women. 
NOW secured Professor Tribe's services to help overturn the ruling 
of an Idaho district judge, who found that Congress had violated 
constitutional norms by extending the ratification period for the 
7. /d. at 27. 
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Equal Rights Amendment. Only two essays later in this volume, 
Tribe argues with seemingly equal conviction that federal courts 
would be obliged to overrule (as constitutionally invalid) any selec-
tive limitations on their jurisdiction imposed by Congress. This ar-
gument was inspired by Tribe's congressional testimony against 
efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over abortion, com-
pulsory school busing for integration, and other causes he favors. 
He does not find it necessary to explain why judicial disregard of 
such limitations would not equally involve judgments "on the legiti-
macy of actions taken to correct perceived flaws" in the Supreme 
Court's "own jurisprudence" -or why the "implications" of this for 
"the integrity of the judicial enterprise" should leave the judges any 
less "uncomfortable." 
Other examples of apparent inconsistency are easy to find in 
this volume but it is doubtless naive to make too much of them. 
Professional advocates must be expected to shade their arguments 
to fit the circumstances of particular clients or causes. What distin-
guishes Professor Tribe's brand of "doing constitutional law" is his 
detachment from the ongoing interests of actual clients. As a part-
time practitioner, he can be selective in the cases he takes up and 
clearly does not depend on property claims for his bread and butter. 
Perhaps partly in consequence, he does not have that instinctive 
concern for order that animated most lawyers before the 1960's and 
still animates most business lawyers today. This is not a matter of 
intellectual consistency but of attitudes toward power-and most 
especially toward the ultimate coercive power wielded by govern-
ment. Where lawyers traditionally viewed the Constitution as a 
shield for the autonomy of private interests-on which their clients 
depended-Tribe sees the Constitution as a vehicle for social jus-
tice, a "lead into a better world. "s This "better world" will be cre-
ated by the state. He is accordingly quite prepared to see the courts 
attempt to manage ongoing social revolutions in the name of consti-
tutional "law." 
This disdain for traditional ordering principles is most evident 
in his essay on "Compensation, Contract and Capital." There he 
complains that the Supreme Court's traditional approach to the 
fifth amendment ban on taking private property without compensa-
tion is "calculated to protect ... from majoritarian rearrangement 
extant distributions of wealth and economic power, almost as 
though such patterns and distributions of capital reflected some-
thing decreed and indeed sanctified by nature rather than something 
8. /d. at 268. 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 211 
chosen by the polity."9 Of course, the original purpose of the "tak-
ing" clause in the fifth amendment (as of article l's ban on state 
laws "impairing the obligation of contracts") was precisely to pre-
vent politicans from regarding "distributions" of wealth as "some-
thing chosen by the polity." The Founders plainly wanted private 
property to be private. Tribe does not try to dispute this original 
purpose of the framers but reminds us that, "Like all parts of the 
Constitution, Compensation Clause and Contract Clause doctrine 
are human creations, constantly in the process of being 
recreated." w 
While "excessively" protecting existing wealth, Tribe com-
plains, the Court "ignores the need for economic and emotional se-
curity among the vast majority of Americans ... in a marketplace 
increasingly dominated by large corporations and unions and vari-
ous appendages of the government." 11 The Constitution, he insists, 
already "offers ample material out of which doctrines could be fash-
ioned to protect those interests."l2 He offers only one example in 
this chapter of how this might be done, but it is instructive. He 
attacks the Court's decision in Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz13 
for allowing Congress to rescind certain previously scheduled fed-
eral pension benefits for railroad workers. Tribe protests that the 
workers' expectations of federal benefits received no protection, 
while federal bondholders would have received full protection if the 
government had sought to welsh on earlier promises to them. That 
the workers sought public benefits-ultimately derived from taxes 
on other people-while the bondholders would be reclaiming their 
own property does not appear as a relevant distinction for Tribe. 
He seems to view nearly all distinctions between public and private 
property as "constitutional choices" which "we" could make 
otherwise. 
Thus he argues at length in an essay on "state action" doctrine 
that all economic transactions, including all private transactions, 
are potentially subject to constitutional challenge as denials of 
"equal protection" since they all depend on an enabling framework 
of state law. He suggests that the Supreme Court is constitutionally 
authorized to consider whether "our" evolving ideals of "equal pro-
tection" can tolerate state laws allowing landlords to evict poor ten-
ants for nonpayment of rent, allowing stores to repossess goods 
purchased on credit when impoverished buyers have defaulted on 
9. /d. at 165. 
10. /d. at 187. 
II. /d. 
12. /d. 
13. 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
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the payments, and so on. Tribe argues in a different essay that the 
Court must take into account the differential effects of seemingly 
neutral regulations of speech on speakers or messages with differing 
financial resources behind them. At least, he suggests, this consid-
eration should lead the court to be more accepting of spending re-
strictions designed to equalize access to the channels of 
communication. Similarly, he argues in yet another essay that the 
Court should go further in recognizing that identical treatment of 
blacks and whites or men and women may leave established "hier-
archies" in place and therefore deny "equal protection of the laws." 
Affirmative action, he suggests-and public benefits, like the financ-
ing of abortions-may be constitutionally required. 
Constitutional Choices does not, in fact, offer a twelve point 
socialist program for the achievement of adequate "equality." It 
does not even attempt to sketch a doctrinal framework indicating 
when the courts should insist on new redistributive ventures and 
when they should leave well enough alone. In his earlier, 1200-page 
treatise, Tribe was equally free with suggestions about government's 
"affirmative" constitutional obligations to equalize conditions and 
provide special benefits for the disadvantaged-and equally unwill- · 
ing to develop these suggestions at all systematically or at all in 
detail.I4 His reticence, then, seems not to reflect inner doubts so 
much as a continuing concern as a practicing advocate not to get 
too far ahead of the Supreme Court with utopian demands or 
alarming programs. 
Far from betraying any doubts or misgivings about grandscale 
social engineering by the judiciary, Tribe boasts of his indifference 
to the practical consequences of such ventures. In his preface, he 
tells us that he writes "out of a conviction that constitutional 
choices, whatever else their character, must be made and assessed as 
fundamental choices of principle, not as instrumental calculations 
of utility or as pseudo-scientific calibrations of social cost against 
social benefits."Is He seems to believe that if employment quotas or 
compulsory school busing--causes that he favorsi6-are correct in 
"principle," then judges must forge ahead with them, whether they 
turn out to be helpful to minorities or (as many critics have warned) 
a net drag on their integration and advancement. He seems to be-
lieve that if it is wrong in "principle" to hold poor people to their 
contracts or leave rich people their wealth, judges must get on with 
their constitutional duty to redistribute financial obligations and as-
14. See, e.g .. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 11-4, § 16-47 (1978). 
15. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at viii. 
16. See id. at 236, 262. 
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sets-whether the ultimate consequences prove helpful to lower in-
come people or (by drying up credit and growth) harmful to the 
poor as a whole. 
Perhaps this overstates Professor Tribe's understanding of the 
distinction between "principle" and "utility." Despite a few refer-
ences to Dworkin, he does not commit himself to a rigorously non-
consequentialist conception of "rights" or "principles." In truth, he 
is no more inclined to engage in extended theorizing on this subject 
than on any other. It may be that his dismissal of "instrumental 
calculations" and "pseudo-scientific calibrations" is simply meant 
to suggest that courts should pay less heed to the analysis of techni-
cal experts, like economists or administrators, and give closer atten-
tion to the constitutional "choices" presented by edifying legal 
advocates, like-well, like Professor Tribe. 
Tribe is not, in fact, doctrinaire about his "principles." When 
other champions of higher causes change their views, he is prepared 
to keep pace. In his 1978 treatise, for example, he ridiculed efforts 
to suppress hardcore pornography, attributing them to the class 
prejudice of those who prefer D.H. Lawrence novels to Hustler 
magazine.I7 In Constitutional Choices of 1985, however, there are 
respectful references to Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKin-
non (the feminist promoters of antipornography ordinances) and 
the suggestion that "[i]t may simply be naive to chalk up ... [the 
defense of pornography which degrades and objectifies women] ... 
as the price we pay for the privilege of expressing ourselves on top-
ics that concern us."Is 
Still, there are definite limits to Professor Tribe's openness to 
new twists of "principle." After more than a decade of impassioned 
right-to-life protest against Roe v. Wade, Constitutional Choices ar-
gues that Roe was too conservative; Tribe propounds a new defense 
of abortion on demand through the entire duration of pregnancy. Is 
there really such a clear moral distinction between the killing of a 
healthy but somewhat premature newborn baby and the abortion of 
an unborn baby after eight or nine months in the womb? Tribe does 
not even bother to acknowledge the moral anguish of abortion, be-
cause he is so intent on developing his thesis that "a right to end 
pregnancy might be seen ... as a matter of resisting sexual and 
economic domination .... "I9 From this perspective, he goes on to 
argue for government's obligation to finance all abortions. For all 
his cautions elsewhere about "arrogant certitudes," Professor Tribe 
17. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 668-69. 
18. L. TRIBE. supra note 3, at 220. 
19. /d. at 243. 
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does not offer even a passing verbal concession here to the tens of 
millions of citizens who believe that abortion is murder and feel that 
government financing of abortion would force them, as taxpayers, 
to contribute to the crime. 
But in fairness to Tribe, it should be said that the candor with 
which he expresses his extreme views on abortion rights is not char-
acteristic of his style. It may be that he was encouraged to develop 
his "principles" more fully in this area by the knowledge that these 
particular principles are only one or two votes ahead of the left wing 
of the Supreme Court2o and only a few steps behind "the most inter-
esting work in the newly emerging feminist jurisprudence."2t In 
other fields, Professor Tribe is typically more vague about the full 
implications of his interpretive suggestions. Perhaps that is because 
he has learned through "doing constitutional law" that courts can 
only manage dramatic redistributions of wealth and power a case at 
a time. Or perhaps his more typical indefiniteness simply reflects 
his commitment to "openness." 
Professor Tribe is indeed quite impatient with those who would 
seek to pin down the precise meaning of constitutional provisions. 
He expresses great exasperation, for example, with the "withering 
... one-sided anticipatory dissection to which the [proposed Equal 
Rights Amendment] has been exposed for over a decade .... "22 
This sort of "anticipatory" analysis seems to irk Tribe because it is 
so alien to the spirit of "doing constitutional law." 
The way Professor Tribe does constitutional law makes it seem 
altogether the most enviable calling in public life. One can float 
from issue to issue as new "principles" suggest and go back on re-
cent "principles" when still newer ones beckon. No need to worry 
about consequences. No need to worry about contrary public opin-
ion. No need to worry about opposing moral traditions. Best of all, 
no need to worry much about all those pedantic theories of legiti-
macy. Who wouldn't rather do constitutional choices than submit 
to the hassle of political compromise and practical constraint? 
20. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977). 
21. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 421 n.36. 
22. !d. at 288 n.42. 
